In the traditional methodology of risk management, a widely accepted practice is to seek rational means to maneuver anticipated risks in a rational way while excluding uncertain events whose probabilities are sufficiently low. The extensive damage caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake revealed the ineffectiveness of existing views on risk management in the area of unforeseen risk. Based on the assumption that all planning and analysis activities are impossible without prior anticipation, this paper presents basic views on the philosophy of risk analysis and its ability to transcend the wall of cognition. In addition, based on the viewpoint of post-positivism, this paper examines the risk communication that occurs between experts and non-experts. It also recommends goals that risk analysis should strive for. Finally, it highlights practical issues that might occur in infrastructure planning and examines challenges inherent in infrastructure planning and management.
INTRODUCTION
Infrastructure planning has played an important role in the justification of decision making in public projects. However, researchers and practitioners who work in the field of infrastructure planning and management increasingly face situations that involve risks related to natural disasters, pollution, nuclear power plant disasters, and so on. They must make decisions about these issues without the benefit of well-founded expertise. Experts from different fields may offer conflicting views on scientific and technical decisions related to infrastructure planning and management. It is also true that planners' values may unconsciously influence their scientific and technical decisions during planning and management stages. As a result, in a number of infrastructure planning cases, the legitimacy of expertise related to infrastructure planning has been questioned because planners were unable to present clear criteria that they relied on during their decision-making processes.
The Great East Japan Earthquake caused damage far beyond what existing disaster planning discourses or urban and regional planning arguments had foreseen. Foreign mass media reported the impact of the Great East Japan Earthquake on an almost daily basis in the aftermath. Many foreigners left Japan because of the nuclear power plant accident. On the other hand, the Japanese people's patience and/or orderly behavior drew praise from abroad. In the meantime, mass media, the national government, and the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), a party to the nuclear accident, repeatedly described the destructive power of the tsunami as "unforeseen." I would frankly agree that the scale of the Great East Japan Earthquake and the nuclear accident that followed far exceeded our anticipation. However, when the national government, TEPCO, or experts that engage in building infrastructure employ the word "unforeseen," a number of thoughts and doubts cross my mind.
On March 23, 2011 , the Japan Society of Civil Engineers, the Japanese Geotechnical Society, and the City Planning Institute of Japan released the following urgent statement under the names of their presidents: This earthquake has been described as the greatest earthquake of all time and [it was] unforeseen. When we use the word "unforeseen," we should not use it as experts' excuses or justifications. We should once again recognize that we have to prepare for massive earthquakes like this by combining soft measures with hard measures -facilities for disaster prevention -while standing in awe of the ferocity of nature, as our predecessors did. We must also review the management systems for electricity and transportation, which people have relied on without anxiety. In particular, we must achieve the vigorous reconstruction of local communities people yearn for…. The presidents' statement again highlighted the seriousness or complexity of problems inherent in the word "unforeseen." The statement is filled with conviction and resolution. It assumes we can tackle the ferocity of nature with the advancements of science and technology. It asserts the belief that we can protect human society against natural disasters by the wielding of hard and soft technologies.
Acts of design and planning are possible only if excess external forces or the social and economic situation can be foreseen. No matter what scenario we sketch, it is possible that something unforeseen can happen. In addition, disasters we are unable to foresee can occur in the future. One explanation posits that risk has become increasingly complex. The greater people's dependency on nuclear power plants or biological and chemical substances created by genetic engineering, the more likely people will encounter new, unfamiliar risks. In addition, as the birthrate declines and the population ages, or, as the traditional family composition breaks down, social cohesion weakens. Neither individuals, nor families, nor local communities can sufficiently manage risk. We may not always possess sufficient knowledge concerning "the kinds of risks we face." An insurmountable wall exists between "what might happen in the future" and "what we know now." Therefore, it is crucial that we begin to anticipate the possibilities of the occurrence of unforeseen incidents. We must ask, can infrastructure planning and management disciplines offer satisfactory solutions to these problems? It is difficult to find solutions for these problems. The goal of this paper is to examine these problems.
THE WALL OF COGNITION
During a news conference held on March 13, 2011, Masataka Shimizu, the President of TEPCO, stated, "The scale of the tsunami far exceeded our anticipation." In response to this statement, Kunio Yanagida 1) sharply questioned the meaning of the word, "unforeseen." Yanagida examined the following three cases in which events were unforeseen: A. an event that was totally unforeseen B. an event that was foreseeable to a certain extent but was excluded because data were dubious or its probability was considered small C. the occurrence of an event was anticipated but it was placed above the upper limits of anticipation based on an optimistic view that believed this type of event would not occur in the near future because large-scale planning and massive investments would be required to manage this event.
According to Yanagida, among a variety of disasters, those disasters that correspond to Case A are very rare. Most disasters correspond to Cases B or C. Alternatively, they may fall between Cases B and C. Based on a review of newspaper articles, he scrutinized the fictional nature of the word "unforeseen." He stated: The cliché, "unforeseen," has been assigned two meanings: On one hand, it means the enormous destructive power -of an earthquake or a tsunami, for example -that can strike an entire system. On the other hand, it can also mean a serious human error or fault in design that might appear at the margins of a system. He stressed that we cannot overcome problems inherent in unforeseen events as long as we adopt the framework of thought that maintains, "We absolutely cannot foresee this type of event," or "We cannot create designs if we consider this type of event."
The national government and the company attempted to evade responsibility for the accident by resorting to the cliché "unforeseen." Ethical discomfort with the government and the company's attitude towards evasion of responsibility underlies the statement made by the presidents of the three academic societies and the argument offered by Yanagida mentioned above. However, in Japan, it is difficult to imagine a situation that would be completely defenseless against disasters. People tend to predict what might happen in the event of a disaster. Municipalities and companies adopt advance disaster prevention measures to minimize disaster damage. Alternatively, they may attempt to inform the public of evacuation methods in cases of emergency. Yet, to prepare for disasters, we must foresee damage that might occur. In general, we are able to foresee because we rely on past experiences or on scientific findings. People seldom encounter major disasters in their lifetimes. Thus, they anticipate disasters by referring to past records, reports from mass media, old stories handed down locally from generation to generation, or announcements by governments.
Science and technology have advanced. Thus, they can narrow the gap that exists between anticipation and reality and increase the chances of avoiding unforeseen damage. The Sanriku earthquakes were anticipated. However, the scale of the Great East Japan Earthquake far exceeded cognitive capacity based on mainstream science and technology. According to research conducted on old earthquakes, old strata revealed that a major tsunami, comparable to the tsunami that occurred this time, had occurred in the past. The Jogan earthquake occurred during the 11th year of Jogan (869 AD), early in the Heian period. Its epicenter was located at the bottom of the sea, east of Mutsu Province. The scale of the earthquake was estimated at a magnitude of at least 8.3. In addition, the results of drilling surveys suggested the possibility that a massive tectonic earthquake, whose epicenter was located off the Pacific coast, had caused a colossal tsunami. However, these findings were not used to prepare for the Great East Japan Earthquake. This fact reveals the difficulties inherent in efforts to change society's cognitive capacity, even with the aid of science and technology, once it has decided on its anticipation of a disaster. As mentioned earlier, Yanagida offered three categories (A, B, and C) of events that are unforeseen. I would propose a fourth category, D: D. the occurrence of an event was, in some ways, anticipated. However, anticipation was considered unrealistic based on socially accepted ideas. Thus, the occurrence was not given adequate consideration.
Socially accepted ideas represent the equilibrium that exists among individuals' anticipations. Once equilibrium is reached, it can be quite difficult to escape this state. I refer to this type of equilibrium as the "trap of cognition." The trap of cognition results from the development of equilibrium based on individuals' anticipations. Let us consider a bit of fiction. Assume you could time travel via time machine to a time before the occurrence of the Great East Japan Earthquake. People are suspicious of the time machine. You have videos or photos of damage caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake. In addition, you have information about the mechanism that caused the earthquake or data related to the scale of the earthquake. Could you accurately inform people about the occurrence of the Great East Japan Earthquake? Mass media might pick up your story and it might become a big topic temporarily. However, the truth you attempt to tell will not be trusted. After a while, it will be forgotten. This means that individuals' anticipations consist of nothing more than an illusion that was created to serve as a common view shared by the people. Even science and technology can be caught in the trap of cognition. When it is accompanied by uncertainty or ambiguity, even scientific and technological knowledge can be rejected as a set of opinions. In particular, this may occur if this knowledge does not fall in line with the existing paradigm. After all, no individuals listened to the opinions you brought because you were able to time travel. However, no guarantee can be offered that the trap of cognition reflects truth. An insurmountable "wall of cognition" exists between truth and anticipation.
Luhmann 2) highlighted the problems inherent in the recognition of society as a system. Humans construct a variety of systems to solve problems in society. However, once construction of a system is complete, opposing domains -the interior and the exterior of that system -emerge. Humans create an elaborately designed system interior. Yet they lack interest in the system's exterior design. To improve the system, they incorporate the system exterior into the system interior. Expansion of the system boundaries does not fundamentally improve the situation. A large area exists that cannot be incorporated into the system interior. In principle, it is impossible to remove a wall located between the system's interior and exterior. In other words, it is impossible to remove the wall of cognition. We cannot know "what we do not know." Furthermore, we cannot know that "we do not know," either. Our ability to foresee that which is unforeseen is limited by our knowledge and information. The ability to observe the exterior of a social system does not exceed the ability of the social system to observe. The only way to overcome the wall of cognition is to enhance science so that we can observe events outside the social system more accurately. However, even science -and whatever scientists can knowconsists solely of theories as long as they are not recognized as socially accepted ideas. Ultimately, the essence of problems related to disaster risk lies in the ways we structure society's ability to process information when it faces risks of disaster or changes in that risk. If a social system becomes increasingly complex, it becomes impossible for the social system to respond promptly to changes in disaster risk. An academic system that can respond sensitively to changes in the surrounding world might be able to perform constant observations of changes in disaster risk.
RISK ANALYSIS (1) Risk society
The concept of modern civil society postulates a view of humans as individuals who possess intellectual and cognitive capability to make rational judgments. These humans operate civil society based on the relationship that exists between cognition and action, which relationship is in turn based on their views. Descartes argued that the natural world is divided between the internalized mental world of humans and the world as an object, which is perceived by the world as a subject. This division led to the development of a modern cognitive framework in which reason grasped causal relations and free will intervened in the outer world. The advancement of science and technology dramatically increased hu-mans' abilities to foresee the future (i.e., "what consequences will my actions cause"). Foreseeability is a prerequisite for the development of science, economy, and politics in modern society, as well as for the development of legal responsibility. In addition, by the end of the eighteenth century, a statistical worldview emerged in which the probability of occurrence was identified based on observations of significant numbers of uncertain events 3) . This led to the development of governance skills that prepared for irreversible risks inherent in society based on probability. These were actually risk-management skills that people hoped would prevent the materialization of risks based on the probability of events. They included the accumulation of funds needed to repair damage in anticipation of materialized risks 4) . In modern society, science and technology have advanced and expertise has become fragmented. "How are risks generated?" "What are risks?" "How are risks distributed in society?" To answer these questions, advanced expertise is required. Because risk analysis is specialized, a large gap in knowledge has developed between experts and non-experts. As a result, in modern society, risk analysis had primarily been considered as the responsibility of experts who possess the scientific knowledge and technical means to secure foreseeability by studying causal relations or calculating risk 4) . Even experts, however, struggle to grasp the complete picture of a complicated risk or to estimate the probability or scale of an accident or disaster. In some cases, new risks, such as nuclear accidents, have emerged whose scale or seriousness resulted from accidents or disasters that experts were unable to predict.
In a risk society, the present is framed by risks that might materialize in the future rather than by risks that occurred in the past. Risks are defined, produced, and distributed based on knowledge that connects the present with the past. As Giddens 5) stated, these risks are precisely a form of "manufactured uncertainty." They have a reflexive structure that relies on human knowledge or technology to decide whether they should be recognized or identified as risks. Simultaneously, they possess a global nature 5) that surpasses individual lives, markets, and local communities. According to Giddens, modernity is characterized by industrial development based on the systematic use of scientific knowledge. Yet scientific knowledge has never questioned the appropriateness or consequences of scientific knowledge. However, in reflexive modernity, which should be called the modernization of modernity, the use of knowledge is routinely subjected to examination by knowledge. The modernization of modernity refers to a reflexive structure in which knowledge is applied to modernity that is driven by the use of knowledge. A statement related to risk is a statement that also relates to values, as well as facts. Beck 6) termed a statement related to risk a mathematicized morality: A risk cannot exist without knowledge about the risk. Yet knowledge about something that does not yet exist cannot be completely objective.
As Beck 7) points out, in modern society, expertise and government intervention alone cannot manage all risks. He argues that decision-making power for issues that involve unforeseeable risks should be freed from experts and bureaucrats and delegated to a new deliberative arena in which diverse individuals and groups, including citizens and NGOs, participate. Exact recreation of these politics is one of the consequences demanded by a risk society. It is difficult to place the heavy responsibility of the prevention of risks solely on experts. Beck 8) expects that non-partisan and temporary micropolitics, modeled after new social movements in each issue area, have stimulated discourse among diverse concerned individuals. However, to enable citizens' responses to new risks, our responsibility does not solely lie in our ability to secure sound communication about risks between experts and non-experts. We must also formulate rules or procedures for discourse so citizens can engage in mature discussions on ways to recognize and respond to risks. We must provide arenas for these types of discourse.
(2) The precautionary principle
We propose that the precautionary principle, a new legal principle, be employed as an epistemological framework to underline a risk society. This principle demands the restructuring of the existing regime's legal responsibility, which currently centers on an approach based on prevention, liability that arises from negligence, and the principle of strict liability. In 1970, this principle was incorporated into Germany's environmental policy. It became a basic principle that aimed at the achievement of both environmental preservation and economic development following the occurrence of acid rain or the Chernobyl nuclear disaster during the 1980s. It is also specified in Article 5 of the Environmental Charter of the French Constitution and Article III-233 of the draft European Constitution. Anxiety has been expressed that the principle encourages populism: Government ignores the possibility of rational choices based on a cost-benefit analysis and rests on the stance of zero risk that bans everything that is suspicious. Thus, government easily responds to the public's irrational fears 10) . In response to these types of criticism, the Commission of the European Communities 11) was convened in 2000. It examined ways to employ the precautionary principle. Risk analysis generally consists of three elements: risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication. Among these elements, the precautionary principle serves as a legal principle related to risk management. The precautionary principle is applied when a risk has been scientifically assessed and the result is believed to include many uncertainties. In applications of the precautionary principle, the following principles are employed: (a) Measures based on the precautionary principle must be proportionate to the desired level of protection and must not aim at zero risk. (proportionality) (b) Measures taken based on the precautionary principle should be enforced for comparable situations in the same ways. The geographical origin of products or the nature of production processes should not lead to arbitrary decisions. (non-discrimination) (c) Measures taken based on the precautionary principle should be consistent with measures already adopted in similar circumstances. (consistency) (d) The benefits and costs of action and lack of action, in both the long and short terms, should be examined (examination of the benefits and costs). However, examination of pros and cons should not be reduced to an economic cost-benefit. (e) These measures should be maintained as long as scientific data remains inadequate, imprecise, or inconclusive, and as long as risks are considered too high. However, the possibility of modifying or abolishing these measures based on advancements in scientific knowledge should be preserved. (f) It can be difficult to develop the burden of proof for a general principle in a systematic manner. Therefore, this possibility should be examined on a case-by-case basis.
First, the precautionary principle should be applied only to a potential risk for which the relationship between cause and effect cannot be established and for which probability or expectation cannot be calculated from statistical data. If the causal relation is clear or the probability calculated from statistics is credible, a preventive approach can be taken. Second, the precautionary principle should be applied to a risk that can cause devastating damage to an entire society or worldwide once it materializes. Third, based on the precautionary principle, a cost-effectiveness analysis should be conducted on any action that involves taking a risk. The results of this analysis must be considered during decision making. The cost-effectiveness analysis should not adopt the framework of a traditional cost-benefit analysis. It must be an act of assessment conducted under a wider framework.
Risks addressed by the precautionary principle are risks that were assessed as uncertain or incalculable based on the extent of damage determined at the stage of risk assessment 12) . If we consider biases inherent in non-experts' perceptions of risk, then traditional risk management requires risk communication between experts and non-experts. Non-experts' perceptions of risk frequently involve biases. However, even an action that was judged a rational choice by experts can arouse suspicions of the rationality of experts' judgments because the nature of the risk may have fundamentally changed. The report provided by the Commission of the European Communities 11) mentions, in the section devoted to cost-effective analysis, that it is necessary to consider non-economic interests because the commission recognizes the usefulness of non-experts' intuitions based on experience or long-term judgments that extend beyond short-term rationality. If individuals who possess expertise have difficulty predicting the consequences of a risk, then decision-making power must be spread among all interested parties who are likely to be influenced by the potential risk. As mentioned in section 4, if deliberative democracy is to be widely vitalized in risk management of unforeseen risks, it is essential that institutional and procedural conditions be established that allow diverse interested parties who are subject to potential risks to participate in decision making and to disclose and share information available, even if that information is essentially uncertain.
The precautionary principle draws attention because it is a legal principle employed in risk management that relates to environmental problems or nuclear power plants. When it is applied to disaster risk issues, this legal principle has the same limitations as any other existing risk analysis. Risk analysis assumes the presence of reasonable humans who will make rational choices based on considerations of possible consequences that might result from their actions and on the probability of these consequences, given the uncertainty that exists about the consequences of their choice of action. In other words, it follows the framework of modern society that relies on the relationship between cognition and action: If choices made by individuals or a society can bring about results laden with enormous uncertainty that might negatively impact society or involve unforeseen risks, then those choices should be prevented. Solutions for risks originate from choices made by humans. Thus, risks are internal to each society. However, disaster hazards are external to the system. It can be difficult to prevent hazards from materializing. Disaster hazards exist outside the boundaries of a social system. No hazards are perceived to exist within these boundaries as long as the social system fails to recognize the hazards. However, once disaster hazards materialize, they may threaten the existence of the social system. Complete application of the precautionary principle has limitations in the management of disaster risks of these types.
(3) The philosophy of risk analysis
The psychology of risk perception 13) points out that humans' risk perceptions often significantly deviate from objective risk or, alternatively, that humans' responses to risk often lack rationality. When faced with individuals' irrational responses to risk, some scholars have argued that risk should be considered a "social construct." For example, Slovic notes that risk is not a substance. Rather, it is a construct that contains the internalizations of the social values or the roles of the individuals who face the risk 14) . Objective risk assessment based on a scientific definition is just one aspect of risk. Slovic argues that risk should be considered a blend of scientific and subjective judgment.
The objectivity or scientific rationality of risk recognition as a part of risk analysis has been widely discussed. Diverse views range from the acceptance of the objectivity of risk recognition to views that deny its existence. Mayo 15) argues that three typical views operate depending on whether the following theses related to the objectivity inherent in risk recognition are accepted: (a) Separability Thesis: Factual and value judgments can be clearly separated during risk analysis and risk management. (b) Scientific Objectivity Thesis: Risk analysis can be performed in a scientifically objective manner.
Based on Iseda, I would consider the following views of risk analysis 16) : (I) positivism, if the view accepts both Theses (a) and (b); (II) cultural relativism, if the view accepts neither of these Theses; and (III) post-positivism, if the view does not accept Thesis (a) but accepts Thesis (b). Although the view that accepts only Thesis (a) is theoretically possible, in fact, no support for this view exists. As we can quickly see, positivism accepts the neutrality or objectivity of risk analysis to its maximum degree, whereas cultural relativism rejects the objectivity of risk analysis entirely.
Traditional risk analysis in the field of engineering has accepted, from the point of view of positivism, the assumption that risk can be measured objectively. It postulates that substantial homogeneity is inherent in risk: Risk can be reduced to the scale referred to as the probability of occurrence. Different types of risk can be compared on the uniform scale referred to as the probability of occurrence. According to positivism, discussions about risk boil down to the question of "acceptable risk." These discussions ask, "How safe is safe enough?" Bernoulli 17) called the probability that humans could judge certain moral certainty with 1000-in-1001 probability "sufficiently certain." Contemporary risk theory is also unable to state how low the probability of an event must be before we can substantially suppose that the event did not occur. It usually considers a risk by applying the probability As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) or As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP) 18) to ascertain acceptable risk. This criterion is defined as the probability that a rational individual can accept when he/she considers costs, benefits, social aspects, technology, and so on. However, the criterion for rationality cannot be defined objectively. Moreover, in modern society where risk is specialized, it is extremely difficult to ask the public to make a rational judgment of an acceptable risk or to achieve consensus on this judgment. On the other hand, cultural relativism, which is often discussed in the social sciences and humanities, totally criticizes the approach taken by engineering that denies the possibility of objective risk assessment. In the field of philosophy of science, cultural relativism has been criticized for setting the criterion for objectivity unfairly high. In an effort to prove cultural relativism, some scholars have offered evidence related to the history of science that states that scientists were socially influenced. Thus, they made decisions under that influence. However, the fact that a conclusion is the product of a social construction does not necessarily mean that the conclusion lacks scientific rationality. Rather, one could argue that a rational decision can be made precisely because of the influence of social factors 18), 19) . This model of cultural relativism paved the way for the possibility of non-experts' participation in policymaking in the fields of science and technology. However, a certain level of restriction must be placed on interventions by non-experts so that risk management, which should be based on the best scientific knowledge, does not degenerate into unscientific responses based on mere speculation or emotion. With respect to post-positivism, Mayo 15) and Shrader-Frechette 20) argue that rational and objective risk analysis is possible, although they dismiss the Sep-arability Thesis by stating that facts and values can be completely separated in science. Shrader-Frechette, among others, argues, from the point of view of scientific proceduralism, that objective and testable risk assessment is possible although it is not free from values. She offered the following three propositions 20) : (a) There is one universal criterion for choice available in both science and risk assessment: explanatory power as tested by prediction. (Proposition 1) (b) The remaining criteria are situation-specific or determined by practice in a naturalistic manner. (Proposition 2) (c) Scientific objectivity is guaranteed by its own predictive and explanatory power and by subjecting the risk assessment to debate or criticism by experts and non-experts in a variety of roles. (Proposition 3) On the other hand, Mayo emphasizes the importance of meta-scientific analysis: He defines "meta" analysis to mean a process that critically investigates the process of risk analysis itself and keeps risk analysis at a distance. In his consideration of the need for value judgments in risk analysis, Mayo criticizes the view that attempts to separate risk analysis from risk management institutionally. Instead, he advocates non-separatism in policy. That is, he suggests that the incorporation of non-experts' perspectives can paradoxically contribute to scientific rationality.
As Weinberg 21) pointed out, logic internal to science cannot answer whether risk management should deal with a dangerous event in which probability is extremely low. During policymaking in disaster risk, decisions about the acceptable level of disaster risk are made based on value judgments, regardless of whether risk recognition is entrusted to experts or it incorporates non-experts' perspectives. Decisions cannot provide scientific reasons. Decisions about acceptable risk can exert enormous impacts on social systems. Therefore, experts and non-experts should attempt to share knowledge and information to ensure the legitimacy of decision making is performed at an acceptable level. In addition, decisions about acceptable risk build walls of cognition in social systems. Constant efforts must be made to perform objective examinations of rationality as it relates to walls of cognition. Thus, as Mayo argues, meta-analysis should be performed to examine risk analysis itself.
RISK COMMUNICATION (1) Challenges for discourse in free society
As technological advancements change the environment, they generate by-products for society.
People must increasingly mobilize their abilities to intervene. The following questions have become important: (a) whether the technical ability to choose is sufficient in comparison to the effects of choice, and whether that ability can provide sufficient freedom; and (b) whether social, communicative competence is sufficient so that we make choices operationally. In this case, the basic challenge for risk management boils down to how it translates differences that emerge in a social system into information, and how it communicates that information. Communication functions as direct involvement by others in a particular action. Therefore, room exists for interference with individuals' freedom. To engage in risk communication and discuss risk management, participants must adhere to common rules of discourse.
Social systems are sites in which multiple freedoms become mixed. They are fraught with the danger of chaos and possible violations of freedom. However, at the same time, once individuals spontaneously solve these problems, social systems can provide precious opportunities for individuals to enjoy freedom from wider perspectives and within social frameworks. In this case, the rules of discourse do not lead to restrictions of our everyday lives. On the contrary, we can achieve a variety of freedoms by applying the rules of discourse. Adherence to rules allows our diverse lives to coexist. In The Open Society and Its Enemies 22) , Popper posited that a free society was an incomplete society. It was incomplete because it remained open to the outside. He examined the sources of knowledge and ignorance and raised a question: "How is it possible to acknowledge that our knowledge is human knowledge, but at the same time [that] it is not always [a result of] individuals' whims or arbitrariness?" This question also asks whether a normative framework can be developed that, on one hand, accepts individuals' whims or arbitrariness and resulting differences of opinion, disputes, or partial chaos, and, on the other hand, beyond these individuals' intentions, can work to provide minimum order for the whole.
(2) Legitimacy in risk communication
The foundation for legitimacy in social decision making lies in the deliberative process in which the foundation for decision making is formed. According to Habermas, discourse is generally "a form of communication with a character of argumentation whose theme is a validity claim at issue and that is aimed at its legitimacy" 23) . Discourse theory emphasizes the importance of achieving consensus in discourse. For example, according to Cohen, the result of a public discourse can claim legitimacy to the extent that it achieves free and reasonable consensus among equal participants 24) . Habermas's discourse theory also bases the legitimacy of a decision on consensus achieved among all participants in the discourse. In modern society, where diverse values coexist, priority is given to the maintenance of the diversity of values over the achievement of consensus. Differences of opinion in public discourses should not be obliterated; they provide fundamental value 25) . In a deliberative process, participants claim the validity of their views and strive for mutual recognition. Validity claims (Geltungsansprüche) during discourse can be divided into (a) truth claims, (b) rightness claims, and (c) sincerity claims 23) . Truth claims are related to the truth of propositions offered in an objective world. Rightness claims are related to the rightness of norms that exist in the social world in which participants live. Sincerity claims relate to the sincerity of statements in speakers' subjective worlds. Participants have to meet validity claims by submitting their reasons for truth and rightness claims, and by behaving consistently during their sincerity claims. Whether a validity claim made by a participant can achieve social consensus depends on whether the validity can obtain inter-subjective approval during the deliberative process.
Because social decision making exerts regional influence on all interested parties, it is almost impossible for those interested parties to participate in public discourse. A theoretical framework is required that does not guarantee the legitimacy of social decision making by a specific discourse. Rather, it guarantees legitimacy by various official and non-official discourses offered as a whole in society. In other words, it is necessary to ensure the legitimacy of decision making based on discourse. That can be achieved by discursive legitimacy 26) . Discursive legitimacy is guaranteed to the extent that decision makers reflexively grasp the collectivity of discourses offered in public spheres and that social decision making falls in line with the content of the whole discourse. Some authors 26) , 27) have noted that (a) discursive representation and (b) meta-consensus are important normative requirements for discursive legitimacy. Discursive representation means that various "discourses" offered in public spheres are properly represented in empowered spaces. Discourses offered by representatives contain diverse values that cannot be attributed to the unit of the individual. Various interests can serve as the unit of representation in social decision making. The important task for discursive representation is to provide a broad and comprehensive understanding of how issues subject to decision making are discussed and what kind of "discourse" is formed. Meta-consensus consists of consensus achieved at a high level that relates to kinds of agreement and disagreement formed in society 26) , 28) . Meta-consensus consists of consensus achieved related to a general frame for recognition that relativizes agreement and disagreement. Once meta-consensus is achieved, participants in discourse can recognize that other participants have paid attention to their concerns or beliefs, even if their views were not agreed upon. Thus, meta-consensus can reconcile the conflicting concepts of consensus and pluralism. If consensus is not reached, but meta-consensus is reached, the results of a public discourse and the pros and cons are finally documented.
The effectiveness of a deliberative system (i.e., deliberative capacity) can be evaluated based on whether a discourse is (a) authentic, (b) inclusive, and (c) consequential 26) . The authenticity of a discourse lies in the extent to which participants accept others' perspectives in a non-coercive fashion, and whether they reflect on their various preferences or values. First, this criterion represents the extent of an ideal situation as stipulated by discourse ethics. In particular, the authenticity of a discourse is required by the first five elements (public sphere, empowered space, transmission process, accountability, and meta-deliberation) of the components of the above-mentioned deliberative system. Second, the inclusiveness of a discourse resides in the extent to which the discourse guarantees opportunities for interested parties or their representatives to participate in that discourse. In particular, the inclusiveness of a discourse is required in the public sphere and in empowered space. Third, the consequentiality of a discourse lies in the extent to which the content of the discourse can exert an impact on the results of social decision making in one way or another. The consequentiality of a discourse is guaranteed by all components of a deliberative system. Judgment of discursive legitimacy requires critical assessment of the ways that proper "discourse" has been conducted in an entire social system. Meta-deliberation consists of reflexive evaluation of the effectiveness of an entire deliberative system. Important tasks include the evaluation of (a) the content of the meta-consensus, and (b) inter-subjective rationality. First, an evaluator must decide whether the content of the meta-consensus meets the requirements of discursive representation. The evaluator must keep in mind that the content of the meta-consensus is, in fact, temporary. During the formation of the meta-consensus, various contests often emerge over hegemony in recognition that occurs among different "discourses." These contests are staged as competitions for the definition of issues, image, identity, rhetoric, and so on. However, based on these contests among "discourses," discussions within a social system can focus excessively on a particular issue. Alternatively, an oversimplified understanding can be developed that might lead to distorted issues during decision making. Evaluation of the contents of the meta-consensus must include examinations of discursive representation. In other words, examiners must decide whether "discourses" that exist in society are comprehensively represented. Second, in situations in which the meta-consensus was reached by public discourse, it is important to examine whether inter-subjective rationality was guaranteed 28) . Inter-subjective rationality is a criterion that attempts to discover if coherent relationships are maintained among values, beliefs, and preferences in the meta-consensus, and whether these relationships are properly reflected during decision making. In other words, it is important to achieve coherence between preferences about a policy proposal expressed by interested parties, fundamental values held by interested parties, and beliefs related to how the policy proposal will affect values. Inter-subjective rationality demands the development of a coherent relationship between the subjective domain of meta-consensus and the objective domain of decision making.
(3) Legitimacy in social decision making
Various organizations, companies, governments, or individuals are involved in disaster risk. For the pluralistic management of disaster risk, rather than reliance on centralized management by government, it is important to achieve a situation of order in which individuals' areas of responsibility are decided based on social interactions among interested parties and during which actors' autonomy is ensured. In general, governance can be defined as "the structure of interrelationships among various social actors constituting a system that is involved in the governance of a human social group and the process of interaction among actors" 29) . This type of definition emphasizes an aspect of governance performed by an actor who operates externally for a social group. However, in disaster risk, it is almost impossible for a particular actor to govern "the structure of interrelationships among various interested parties facing disaster riska question [of] how disaster risk should be recognized -and the process of interaction among interested parties."
In this case, "how cooperative disaster risk management is realized among various interested parties" is the perspective that should be applied to disaster risk governance. When various interested parties are assumed, two problems emerge: (a) the "problem of many eyes," and (b) the "problem of many hands." First, the "problem of many eyes" results from the fact that many interested parties evaluate disaster risk functions differently and apply different evaluation criteria. The "problem of many hands" results from the fact that a decision reflects the intentions of many different actors. When this decision changes, it can be difficult to locate the responsibility for that change. In disaster risk management, it can become quite difficult to identify the individual responsible for the resulting change. To fundamentally resolve these two problems, it is necessary to clarify the areas of responsibility assumed by each interested party (e.g., according to the principles of "self-help, mutual help, or public help").
Interested parties that face disaster risk possess diverse values and interests. They maintain different levels of demand related to disaster risk based on their varying viewpoints. In the case of diverse interests, it is almost impossible to achieve a consensus that will satisfy all actors. Therefore, it is critical to determine which actors' opinions and demands will be considered valid. With respect to issues related to legitimacy, the process by which participants understand interested parties' demands or concerns about disaster risk, and the process by which participants evaluate the levels involved in disaster prevention based on comprehensive and broad viewpoints play significant roles in decision making. In addition, highly technical judgment is required for disaster risk management. To ensure legitimacy in social decision making, it is necessary to evaluate the validity of the contents of the decision making activity from a technical point of view. It is also important to understand the contents of the demands for or concerns of diverse interested parties.
According to Suchman 30) , "legitimacy" is "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions." Once it has become legitimized, an organization can enlist understanding, trust, or support. The definition of legitimacy includes the perspectives of external observers or audiences on the actions of an actor or organization. This is a concept that operates independent of a particular observer. Judgments of the actions of particular actors are made based on collective perspectives. Legitimacy can be categorized into (a) pragmatic legitimacy, (b) moral legitimacy, and (c) cognitive legitimacy. First, pragmatic legitimacy relies on whether an actor's actions promote the interests of all people concerned. Pragmatic legitimacy is granted when the actor's actions benefit all actors concerned, or are expected to benefit society as a whole. For example, to ensure pragmatic legitimacy in social decision making, a cost-benefit analysis is employed.
However, it is almost impossible to guarantee benefits for all actors concerned by the construction of infrastructure. Therefore, the concept of pragmatic legitimacy alone cannot legitimize the construction of infrastructure. Second, moral legitimacy relies on judgments that decide whether actions are right. Evaluations of moral legitimacy are divided into (a) evaluations of consequences of actions, (b) evaluations of procedures related to those actions, and (c) evaluations of actors. Evaluations of consequences that result from the construction of infrastructure consist of evaluations to determine (a) whether actors have sustained disadvantages or whether the environment has been sufficiently considered, (b) whether the area that sustained a negative impact has received minimization efforts, and (c) whether sufficient measures to mitigate the impact were taken. Evaluations of procedures of actions imply that decision making during the construction of infrastructure occurs in accordance with a series of procedurally valid, fair rules, and that the transparency of the process is guaranteed. Evaluations of actors consider whether actors possess appropriate structures of motivation and whether they will receive rewards as trustees. For example, when an actor has an objective that contains conflicting interests, it is difficult to say whether that actor has an appropriate structure of motivation and reward. An audience can judge whether the actor's actions are appropriate when the actor demonstrates an ability to implement the required actions. They can also judge whether the actor maintains appropriate structures of motivation and rewards to implement them. Third, cognitive legitimacy is not based on interest or evaluation. Rather, it is based on decisions of whether necessity is socially recognized. The criteria for this type of legitimacy include, among others, comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness 30) . Comprehensibility refers to whether the consequences of an action are predictable and whether the content and consequences of the action are comprehensible. On the other hand, taken-for-grantedness means that an action and its consequences have been sufficiently discussed and examined, and that its content is mature enough to be taken for granted socially.
(4) Risk communication and the structure of trust
The Great East Japan Earthquake created various "walls." Simultaneous with the occurrence of the earthquake, the country became divided into the stricken area and the unstricken area. Even within the stricken area, people were divided into those who suffered from damage and those who did not. Those located outside the stricken area had no information about events that occurred in the stricken area. Today, those located in the stricken area understand the limited extent to which those located outside the stricken area are familiar with the damage they suffered and are aware of the kind of rescue operations initiated. A wall had been constructed to prevent the communication of information between the stricken and unstricken areas. This type of wall also developed between Japan and foreign countries. However, during the Great East Japan Earthquake, those located inside the wall of disaster believed, "Those located outside the wall will come to help us." In addition, those located outside the wall believed, "Those located inside the wall are waiting for help." The communication of trust is not limited to the above-mentioned one-dimensional relationship; it is strengthened by higher-order communication. In other words, those located inside the wall believed, "Those located outside the wall believe that those located inside the wall are waiting for help"; those located outside the wall believed, "Those located inside the wall believe that those located outside the wall will come to help us." These interrelationships further deepen and develop infinitely. This infinite repetition of the structure of a relationship of trust is precisely the structure of common knowledge noted in game theory. Although direct communication between those located inside and outside the wall terminated, communication remained possible because of the development of a relationship of trust. Because of this relationship of trust, people could overcome the wall created by the disaster that prevented communication between the inside and the outside.
In modern society, an unspecified significant number of people, in their relationships with one another, decide whether they trust each other. In this type of situation, it can be difficult for individuals to decide whether others are trustworthy. Knowledge and information possessed by local residents, companies, and other organizations become dispersed; their content becomes extremely diversified, complicated, and specialized. Luhmann 2) defines the extent of diversity during possible events in society as "complexity." People discover some order and regularity within complex society. He states that trust can reduce social complexity. Because of trust, individuals can live in society while facing the complexity of potentially undecided events. Trust can be defined, in a broad sense, as "counting on various expectations a person entertains (for others or society)." This relationship of trust can be considered a two-person relationship that forms between a person who trusts (truster) and a person who is trusted (trustee). Trustworthiness resides in the nature of the trustee. This refers to whether the person engages in trustworthy actions. On the other hand, trust depends on an evaluation of a person's trustworthiness. Two types of trust exist: (a) trust that depends on whether a person is able to complete an action (i.e., trust related to ability); and (b) trust that the other person has no intention to exploit (i.e., trust in intention) 31) . The trustworthiness of a trustee alone does not create trust between the truster and the trustee. Even if a trustee possesses trustworthiness, if the truster cannot understand this fact, it can be difficult to create a relationship of trust between these individuals. A relation of trust is formed during a situation in which consistency is realized between both parties' expectations and their actions. In other words, trust develops in a situation in which a trustee understands a truster's trust in the trustee and chooses to perform a trustworthy action. Simultaneously, the truster trusts the trustee because he/she realizes that the trustee is trustworthy.
Trust involves reliance on the expectations of others despite an uncertain future. Although they rely on limited information, individuals make judgments about others' trustworthiness. If only uncertain information is available, a truster must trust. He or she must believe that "the trustee is trustworthy." Similarly, a trustee must choose a trustworthy action that the trustee must perform although the trustee cannot completely know if the truster actually trusts the trustee. Therefore, for trust between a truster and a trustee to develop, both truster and trustee must agree to assume the risks involved in trusting the trustee or gaining the truster's trust. This type of interdependent relationship can only be realized if the "complementarity of expectation" remains relevant between the truster and trustee. The term, complementarity of expectation, is used to describe situations in which the actions of each of two actors do not run counter to each other's expectations. When the principles involved in the complementarity of expectation are relevant, the truster and trustee decide to act in expectation of each other's actions. However, the complementarity of expectation does not solely involve each participant's expectations of the other's actions. It also includes a reasoning process that operates at a new level that involves one individual's expectations of the other individual's expectations of each other's actions. As a result, both parties' reasoning processes develop infinitely to become reasoning that occurs at a higher level: The truster and trustee engage in reflexive reasoning that includes each other's expectations of each other's expectations. If they choose to follow this type of reflexive reasoning, trust can be reflexively created by an act in which the truster trusts himself/herself or by an act in which a trustee proves his/her trustworthiness. The principle of the complementarity of expectation prescribes a behavioral rule for a truster that stipulates, "A truster trusts a trustee only if the truster's trust can motivate the trustee's trustworthiness." The principle prescribes a behavioral rule for a trustee that stipulates, "A trustee shows trustworthiness to a truster only if the trustee's trustworthiness can motivate the truster's trust."
Based on game theory, Hatori and Kobayashi analyzed a mechanism used that spontaneously generates the complementarity of expectation based on communication among people 32) . However, for the complementarity of expectation to emerge as the equilibrium of communication among rational humans, very strict restrictions must be imposed on individuals' actions. Even if the complementarity of expectation were to be established, if an event contrary to the expectation were to occur, it may become impossible to maintain the complementarity of expectation afterwards. To respect individuals' free will and to develop complementarity of expectation widely in a social system as a whole, it is necessary to loosen the concept of perfect rationality that operates in game theory. One technique involves the introduction of the concept of limited rationality. If individuals' capacities to remember or abilities to analyze are limited, then complementarity of expectation can be maintained even if expectations are betrayed because of the virtue of forgetfulness. As is generally known, the Japanese word, "Akirameru" (to give up), bears the connotation, "clarify." Individuals' clear understanding of an event that occurs in the surrounding world and their acceptance of this event "as it is" is a precondition for individuals "giving up." In this case, a spirit of tolerance must be thoroughly applied. Clear understanding and a spirit of tolerance can provide either a foundation or social capital that can be used to establish the complementarity of expectation in Japanese culture.
PLANNING CHALLENGES (1) Infrastructure planning and practice
Infrastructure planning and management is one of the practical disciplines that are closely related to the real world. It was created to address the practice in the real world in which the fruit of civil engineering is produced. It aims to combine "formal knowledge" based on technical rationality and "implicit knowledge in the field." Practical research contains an essential problem: Because it maintains the characteristics of individuality, symbolism, and positivity, its validity cannot be sufficiently evaluated based on the positive scientific criteria of universality, logicality, and objectivity. Consequently, the practice of civil engineers runs the risk of encountering three possible situations:
(a) They do not understand the meaning of "professional." Thus, their reflection in action is barely sufficient. (b) They adhere to the view that they are technical professionals. Thus, they lack sufficient opportunities for reflection in the practical world. (c) Reflective practitioners cannot consider reflection in practice formal knowledge. To overcome these situations, I suggest that (a) it is extremely important to deepen the study of consideration in reflection, and (b) the dilemma of rigor or relevance can be solved by the development of practical epistemology 33) . Infrastructure planning and management is a discipline that was developed exactly by practice in civil engineering. Yet some might say that practical research remains immature. During development of a model of practical research, the individuality, symbolism, and positivity of practical research must be considered. It is important to engage in continuous efforts to transform knowledge in the field by the transcription of good examples of practices or actions into formal knowledge.
(2) Two-fold dominance
Practical research can be considered an attempt to transform implicit knowledge gained in the field into formal knowledge by interaction with an object, while adequately considering its ambiguity in a concrete place or time. However, it is necessary to pay attention to pitfalls that might accompany practical research. These pitfalls might originate from (a) a principle of individuality, (b) a principle of symbolism, and (c) a principle of positivity contained in practical research.
First, an object of practical research is restricted by time -the present -and by the space in which the object is situated. Because practical research cannot be separated from the individual context in which the object to be studied is situated, a danger exists that practical research may devolve into a simple description of an individual case. When it addresses a concrete and individual case, practical research must objectify that case to build up the universal system of "knowledge." At the same time, depending on the case being studied, it must attempt to relativize the case by identifying individual factors that deviate from the universal system of knowledge. Furthermore, the practice of infrastructure planning and management must address the problem of institutional subordination: Infrastructure planning and management must be executed under actual institutional, financial, or human restrictions. That is, methods or perspectives used for evaluation must be subordinate to institutions. Often, an evaluation of a practice may only be valid under a given institutional framework. In the real world, an issue related to an institution may, in fact, also be influenced by its relationships with other institutions (i.e., the problem of institutional complementarity). In addition, the problem of a conflict that develops between institutional individuality and universality becomes involved. Thus, a difficult problem involving relativism may occur: During the pursuit of universality, practical research must identify individuality based on relativization.
Second, investigation of an issue involves researchers as practitioners. Yet it also involves others who maintain different interests and values. Practitioners who participate in infrastructure planning and management transmit information related to social decision making as messages to other involved actors. Information transmitted by a sender is based on an expectation within the sender's cognitive system. A receiver whose cognitive system differs can interpret the sender's information in diverse ways. In general, it can be extremely difficult to achieve a common understanding of others' viewpoints or to achieve recognition by communication among actors who possess different interests or values. The major factor that can disrupt smooth communication among concerned actors is the differences that operate in their cognitive systems. Participants in communications state their demands or viewpoints. However, other participants do not necessarily make common interpretations of those messages. First, even within a single individual's cognitive system, a word can have many meanings, depending on the situations or contexts experienced by that individual. The types of meaning that an individual attaches to a word spoken by another individual depend on the receiving individual's recognition of the situation in which he or she is involved. Second, symbolic meaning contained in a word is structured based on an individual's experiences or knowledge. It can be difficult to reach an agreement on the meaning of a word among others who have different experiences or knowledge. Stakeholders involved in an issue may recognize the issue differently and attach a variety of meanings to it. It is necessary to understand that an issue must be addressed as a symbolic whole that contains a variety of diverse recognitions and meanings. An analysis of the structure of the meanings of that issue must be performed. Third, those who conduct practical research do not remain independent of the issue involved. Rather, they positively address that issue with the aim of discovering challenges or pathology within the issue and with the hopes of improving that issue. Because of this principle of positivity, practical research maintains some intrinsic pitfalls.
Because the practice of infrastructure planning and management is not free of values and because it re-mains a social enterprise 34) filled with a certain kind of complexity, it bears the de-neutralizing tendency of researchers. This tendency results from practical research's inability to maintain distance from or reduce tension caused by practical demands made by politics 35) . In addition, when researchers fail to attend to the problem of restricted entities, because they are not independent of their history or culture, or when they fail to reflect on a particular cultural view or values, they collide with the pitfall of de-neutralization. This pitfall is unique to researchers; it causes the problem of the "ethos of involvement." The "ethos of involvement" examines the appropriateness of a frame set for an area that will be studied by practical research. It defines the appropriateness of the stance of those intellectuals and academics involved in the research. Furthermore, the principle of positivity that operates in practical research can also cause a methodological problem: "Practitioners themselves become those who evaluate practice." Practical research always involves practice evaluation. However, in many cases, practitioners evaluate their own practice. In those cases, practitioners' routine recognition, interpretation, or institutional restrictions can impede their analyses of practices and possibly undermine the objectivity of research. To overcome this difficult problem, those who engage in practical research must observe practices while distancing themselves as far as possible from those practices, even if they observe their own practices. Practitioners require a perspective that allows them to "objectify practices," as well as a perspective that allows them to "objectify the act of objectifying practices." Practical research involves the creation of a model used to describe a practice to "evaluate an action a practitioner could achieve" or to understand "what the practice is." However, practical research is not solely limited to these actions. It requires a tool that can be used to explain, in as objective a manner possible, the appropriateness of the "act of analyzing a practice" in relation to the issue addressed. I would declare this process that occurs in practical research the "objectification of objectification" 33) .
(3) Legitimacy for infrastructure planning Infrastructure planners (i.e., practitioners involved in infrastructure planning) evaluate the validity of scientific and technical decisions on the creation of infrastructure based on the expertise (frame) of civil engineering. Infrastructure planners rely on tools (repertoire) developed in their field, such as theories and models used in civil engineering, to justify the bases for their decisions or decision-making processes. However, issues that infrastructure planners address frequently involve a trans-boundary nature or complexity that far exceeds the planners' frame. In some cases, infrastructure planners are also asked to make decisions about issues that may exceed their frame. This can lead to conflicts between researchers or engineers in other fields. In addition, a larger difference exists in the frame between infrastructure planners and interested parties in general.
Scholars have highlighted the dilemma of rigor or relevance inherent in scientific and technical decisions as a possible cause for the development of conflicting opinions 36) . Infrastructure planners are subject to academic competition from organizations involved in infrastructure planning, such as the Japan Society of Civil Engineers and related academic societies. In those instances, infrastructure planners are required to present evidence of rigor in their scientific and technical decisions. They must base their decisions on precise data or definite proof. In general, however, interested parties tend to pay more attention to the relevance of technical decisions. They care more about whether the decisions will be helpful and remain consistent with common sense than they care about the rigor of the technical decisions. Infrastructure planners must judge whether they attach more importance to the rigor of technical decisions or to the relevance of these decisions so they can coordinate interested parties' wishes from a practical point of view 37)-39) . In addition, interested parties who possess diverse values and interests also possess different frames. To discover an appropriate frame to be used to settle issues, coordination of frames put forward by different actors is required. To achieve this type of coordination, infrastructure planners must attempt to relativize their frame by engaging in communication with diverse interested parties or with experts from other fields 30)-43) . Then, they must engage in a procedure that will allow the construction of a new frame.
Infrastructure planners must relativize their frame to avoid the closed nature of expertise. Infrastructure planners must understand how dependent their frame of expertise is on situations. They must recognize anew that their frame consists of knowledge obtained under limited conditions and variables. Because this frame is often internalized by infrastructure planners' communities, such as the Japan Society of Civil Engineers and related academic societies, a possibility can arise that infrastructure planners may unconsciously accept a limited frame that is specific to infrastructure planning. Infrastructure planners must recognize differences that arise between their frame and frames possessed by professionals or researchers in other fields. They must also understand the entirety of the cognitive structure possessed by the public that lives in the target area in relation to the creation of infrastructure. Thus, infrastructure planners must understand that extremely diverse frames may be employed to address the same issue. They must clarify the location of their frame within these other frames.
Only infrastructure planners' efforts to relativize their frame can pave the way for communication among professionals who possess different expertise or among users who live in local communities. In particular, users who reside in local communities, may, in many cases, possess empirical knowledge that can serve as precious material for use during social decision making. People who live in local communities possess local knowledge related to local circumstances. If infrastructure planners create a frame solely based on knowledge obtained under limited conditions, no guarantee can be offered that the frame will be suitable for local conditions. Thus, infrastructure planners must not only reflect on their frame. They must also "grant reason" to local voices.
If an issue involves complexity or a trans-boundary nature, practitioners must form partnerships with professionals or researchers who possess different frames or repertoires. Practitioners must remain sensitive to gaps in precision that exist between the repertoire in their own intrinsic field and newly obtained trans-boundary repertoires. The domain of knowledge that relates to practical challenges involved in infrastructure planning often extends far beyond the field of infrastructure planning. For example, it can extend as far as the fields of social science and the humanities. Even if practitioners must rely on a repertoire that exists in an extended domain, they must employ a repertoire that is equal to or better than the repertoire employed by practitioners in each field. They must not err by applying superficial knowledge or a complacent understanding of fields that extend beyond the boundary. When practitioners attempt to extend beyond the boundary of their knowledge, they must jump into fields located beyond the boundary. They must attempt to learn methods and methodology related to those fields, and compete academically with practitioners or researchers in those other fields.
CONCLUSION
Modern civil society postulates rational choices made by an individual based on that individual's reason and free will. An individual clarifies ordinality or laws that operate between the causes and effects that operate among various events (i.e., "objects" in the external world). If an individual possesses free will, that individual, as a "subject," exerts an influence on the external world. If people are equipped with adequate reason and judgment, they must avoid causing damage that might occur under their will and responsibility, to the extent that such damage can be avoided by the proper use of free will. However, the experiences from the Great East Japan Earthquake have again provided a reminder that a disaster can occur whose causal relation even humans who possess adequate reason and judgment cannot understand. Therefore, this type of disaster is impossible to predict.
During their experiences during the Great East Japan Earthquake, people discovered it is almost impossible to prevent damage caused by a major earthquake by the use of infrastructure such as breakwaters and seawalls. With respect to a major disaster that might occur once in a thousand years, the idea of disaster prevention that attempts to prevent the occurrence of damage is insufficient. We cannot adopt solely the idea of disaster reduction that attempts reductions in damage. When we are faced with natural threats, we cannot completely control disaster risk, even with advanced science and technology. The idea of disaster reduction is based on changes in our way of thinking and in the modest acceptance of the limitations of civil engineering. In other words, we must accept that enormous disaster risk may occur that we will be unable to control, even with our accumulated knowledge and wisdom. At the same time, we must declare that we guarantee that it is minimally possible for people to protect their lives even during crises in which disaster may surpass the walls of cognition (i.e., the prerequisite for the idea of disaster prevention). Modern society postulates that individuals' dignity and free will be respected to their maximum and that a social system operates based on individuals' rational choices. Even during a crisis or disaster, the ontological framework of modern society that guarantees (minimum) free options must be adhered to. This is the main idea of disaster reduction.
The idea of disaster reduction is based on the concept of multiple defenses that attempt to build a new disaster reduction system that will operate beyond the wall of the existing disaster prevention system. A mountain of unresolved issues remains. How can we establish a boundary between disaster prevention and disaster reduction and a boundary between the public realm and the private realm? How can we encourage cooperation between those located inside and outside the boundaries? Infrastructure planners must develop a philosophy of disaster reduction and create a methodology for its practice. Attempts to distinguish between disaster prevention and disaster reduction and between the public and private realms may be irrelevant. Rather, it is more important to understand that these factors create a mixed system in which governance works to develop an entire system in which both sides can relate to each other. Cooperation among people who operate within this system is expected and supported by the social capital of trust. Based on good intentions and a spirit of cooperation, many voluntary organizations developed after the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred. They also developed after the occurrences of the Great Hanshin and Awaji Earthquakes. Perhaps, because they felt somewhat embarrassed by the damage from the earthquake, many Japanese were proud of the praise provided by foreign media for their good manners or orderly behavior when they faced disaster. We hope that the ties that developed among people because of that cooperation are not temporary. We also hope they will lead to increased opportunities for reconstruction of the stricken area and increased community building.
When they were faced with the unbelievable disaster of the Great East Japan Earthquake, the victims firmly embraced their misfortune in the midst of their grief. They did not become apathetic or violent. They politely took steps towards reconstruction by continuing to do what they needed to do. These victims' attitudes appear unique in the world. Even now, people born and raised in the stricken area continue to demonstrate strength and flexibility. They live strong and steadily. They cherish connections among people and they have been supported by wisdom and knowledge. Traditional Japanese society operates in this manner. It provides the world with a model for how an affluent society survives in an era filled with risk. The Zokutoroku (續燈録) of Zengo (禅語) states, "The one-thousand-year green of an evergreen tree, people do not care about; the one-day red of a tree peony, young nobles in Mǎnchéng become intoxicated with." Young nobles in Mǎnchéng become intoxicated with the ephemeral fresh flowers of a tree peony. The green of an evergreen tree does not attract attention as often. However, when an icy-cold wind begins to rage, the eternal beauty of the evergreen tree, which previously did not stand out, is appreciated anew. The world hopes that the area stricken by the Great East Japan Earthquake will be reconstructed as soon as possible. I believe that vigorous reconstruction will occur because it will be supported by a network of constant trust.
